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The Colorblind Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality:
The Case for a New Legal Ideal for Race Relations
Destiny Peery*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

―The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race.‖1 Chief Justice Roberts‘s statement in Seattle Schools2 captures the
dominant contemporary and historical legal approach to diversity that has existed since
Justice Harlan‘s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,3 introducing the concept of a
colorblind Constitution. 4 Since at least the time of Plessy there has been a large group of
colorblind proponents that advocates that the law should be colorblind as a means to
achieving equality under the law. The legal definitions extracted from debates among
legal scholars and captured in judicial opinions highlight the importance, in the minds of
many, of ridding the law (and society in general) of racial categories that divide and lead
to negative outcomes on the basis of these divisions.
Like judges and legal scholars, social scientists define colorblindness, doing so
similarly, but somewhat more precisely than their legal counterparts. For example, some
social scientists define colorblindness has been defined as an ―ideology in which all
people [are] to be judged as individual human beings[] without regard to race or
ethnicity.‖5 Another approach ―focuses on ignoring cultural group identities or realigning
them with an overarching identity.‖ 6 Like the definitions coming from the legal domain,
these definitions highlight the importance of de-emphasizing group distinctions in order
to achieve a higher good of considering all people as individuals rather than simply
members of social categories like race. The assumption underlying a colorblind approach
is that as long as people do not ―see‖ categories such as race, they cannot discriminate on
the basis of them.
Not everyone agrees that colorblindness is possible or that it is the ideal approach
to diversity. In the legal field, the debate has taken the form of arguments in favor of
*
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1
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
2
Id.
3
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (―Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.‖).
5
Carey S. Ryan, Jennifer S. Hunt, Joshua A. Weible, Charles R. Peterson & Juan F. Casas, Multicultural
and Colorblind Ideology, Stereotypes, and Ethnocentrism Among Black and White Americans, 10 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 617, 618 (2007).
6
Flannery G. Stevens, Victoria C. Plaut & Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks, Unlocking the Benefits of Diversity: AllInclusive Multiculturalism and Positive Organizational Change, 44 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 116, 119
(2008).
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either colorblindness as articulated by Justices Roberts or Harlan, for example, or in favor
of race consciousness. Prominent legal scholars on the side of race consciousness have
argued for the law to be race-conscious in light of the reality that people have been and
remain race-conscious,7 as well as the facts of existing racial inequalities. 8
In the social sciences, the debate between colorblindness and race consciousness
has also occurred, with an emphasis on the efficacy of colorblind and multicultural
ideologies or mindsets for reducing prejudice and discrimination and improving
intergroup relations.9 In recent years, psychologists have conducted research on the
psychological implications of these approaches in terms of basic psychological processes
like person perception and attitudes toward social groups.
In an effort to bridge the gap between the theoretical discussion in the legal field
and the empirical discussion in psychology, this Comment will review the arguments
made on both sides of the legal debate, as well as the empirical evidence that suggests
something about the true efficacy of colorblind versus race-conscious (or multicultural)
approaches to dealing with diversity.
This Comment argues: (1) colorblindness is, under most circumstances,
undesirable given its recently discovered negative outcomes, particularly for the very
groups or individuals it is meant to protect; (2) true colorblindness is unrealistic given the
psychological salience of race; and (3) race consciousness in the law is necessary to
ensure equal treatment of racial groups in regulated domains such as housing, education,
and employment.
Part II of this Comment reviews the legal debate around colorblindness and race
consciousness, with an analysis of where it has been and where it currently stands. Part
III reviews the psychological literature examining how we cognitively construct and use
categories, with an emphasis on the salience and inevitability of racial categorization.
Categories are the basis for making racial distinctions, and thus, understanding how
categories operate psychologically is an important foundation for understanding the
debate about colorblindness. In addition, the psychology of categories is helpful to
understanding why the negative effects of colorblindness described in Part IV might
occur despite the good intentions of those wishing to adopt a colorblind perspective.
Part IV reviews the psychological literature examining the efficacy of colorblind
versus multicultural approaches in various realms of interracial or intergroup contact,
including stereotyping, expression of prejudice, and interracial interactions. The relative
advantages and disadvantages of colorblindness and multiculturalism will be explored
through an examination of the empirical evidence testing these approaches.
Finally, Part V analyzes the current legal debate around colorblindness versus race
consciousness in light of recent psychological research. Part V will conclude by arguing
that since true colorblindness is unrealistic and undesirable in important ways, the law
7

See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
8
Black America Reports, Report Sees “Sobering Statistics” on Racial Inequality, CNN.COM, Mar. 25,
2009 [hereinafter Sobering Statistics], http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/25/black.america.report/index.html
(citing statistics showing that blacks are two times as likely to be unemployed, three times as likely to live
in poverty, and more than six times as likely to be imprisoned compared to whites.).
9
See, e.g., Destiny Peery & Jennifer A. Richeson, Broadening Horizons: Considerations for Creating a
More Complete Science of Diversity, 21 PSYCH. INQUIRY 146 (2010); Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Science:
Why and How Difference Makes a Difference, 21 PSYCH. INQUIRY 77 (2010).
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should be race-conscious in order to move society closer to achieving the racial equality
so desired by proponents of colorblindness and race-consciousness alike.
II. THE LAW AND COLORBLINDNESS
A. Historical Case Law and Colorblindness
The anti-discrimination principle likely led to colorblindness in the law 10 by
representing a ―moral principle [in the law] that prohibits discrimination.‖ 11 Proponents
of this principle argue that it was born out of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 12 and later enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 13 The antidiscrimination principle was once considered very much in line with the concept of
colorblindness, and in fact, it was argued by some that the anti-discrimination principle
necessitated a colorblind approach. The most famous example of this comes from Justice
Harlan‘s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.14 In stating, ―Our constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,‖ 15 Harlan argued that the antidiscrimination principle required the Constitution and law generally to be colorblind. 16
Because the anti-discrimination principle requires the law to avoid discriminating against
individuals on the basis of group or category membership when it comes to affording
individuals rights and privileges guaranteed by the law, it also recommends equal
treatment (in other words, color or other category blindness) when it comes to affording
treatment.
¶11
Just as Justice Harlan‘s dissent in Plessy articulated the relationship between the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the anti-discrimination
principle,17 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 18 which followed three years
after the Fourteenth Amendment, also contained language aimed at putting in place a
colorblind, anti-discrimination principle.19 Section 1983, despite relying on race-neutral
language like the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 has been used mostly to enforce the antidiscrimination principle by providing a basis for claims against alleged perpetrators of
discrimination, particularly racial discrimination. Thus, both the Fourteenth Amendment
and Section 1983 were policies that, when applied, considered race despite their
technically race-neutral construction. In addition, cases leading up to the civil rights era
challenging discriminatory practices in housing, education, employment, and other
¶10

10

See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992) (containing a full discussion of the history
of the colorblind ideal in U.S. constitutional history, including its link to the anti-discrimination principle).
11
John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The
Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 428 (2002).
12
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . equal protection of the laws.‖)
(emphasis added).
13
Hasnas, supra note 11, at 428; see also KULL, supra note 10.
14
163 U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896).
15
Id. at 559.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
19
The language of this section prohibits private parties, including individuals, from depriving other persons
of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. Id.
20
Both refer only to ―persons,‖ which has been construed to protect racial groups, for example, but does
not require such a construal given the race-neutral construction.
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domains of social life relied on the previously established link between the antidiscrimination principle and colorblindness to argue that colorblindness was required in
order to remedy an explicit denial of rights in those areas.
¶12
Brown v. Board of Education powerfully articulated the relationship between
colorblindness and the anti-discrimination principle. 21 The Court‘s holding in Brown
relied strongly on the idea that the way to avoid perpetuating existing racial inequalities
and racial segregation was to stop separating people on the basis of race, as doing so was
inherently discriminatory.22 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in Brown, further
advocated colorblind thinking about the Fourteenth Amendment when he wrote, ―The
most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to
remove all legal distinctions among ‗all persons born or naturalized in the United
States.‘‖23 The civil rights movement and the legislation that accompanied it, namely the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 24 began to erode the relationship between the existing antidiscrimination principle and colorblindness. Up to that point, key legal decisions closely
linked the ideals of anti-discrimination and colorblindness.25 The civil rights movement
began to explicitly differentiate between the two on the basis that colorblindness was
insufficient to uphold equal protection under the law and to guarantee equal rights and
privileges. 26 Instead, civil rights advocates argued that law and policy must take race into
account in order to ensure that the implementation of legally-required colorblindness (in
other words, anti-discrimination, equal rights and privileges) occurred as required by
law. 27
¶13
The conflict between the values of freedom and egalitarianism without the
consideration of racial distinctions on the one hand and the reality of a historical legacy
of racial bias and persistent maintenance of racial bias during this time, on the other hand,
created the ―new American dilemma of race.‖ 28 This ―new‖ dilemma, the conflict
between egalitarianism and the realities of racial inequality, also created a conflict
between the need to avoid seeing race to appear egalitarian and the need to see race in
order to remedy inequality. 29
B. Contemporary Case Law and Colorblindness
¶14

Contemporary considerations of the tension between egalitarianism and existing
racial inequality do not resolve the tension between the anti-discrimination principle and
the colorblind ideal that still exists. Three cases in particular represent the current state of
the colorblind ideal in case law and the continued relevance of the conflict of ideals and

21

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 495 (―Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.‖).
23
Id. at 489 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV); see also id. at 490 (―In the first cases in this Court
construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as
proscribing all state-imposed discriminations on the Negro race.‖).
24
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
25
See, e.g., KULL, supra note 10.
26
Id. at 183.
27
Id.
28
James M. Jones, Psychological Knowledge and the New American Dilemma of Race, 54 J. SOC. ISSUES
641, 643, 645 (1998).
29
Id.
22

476

Vol. 6:2]

¶15

¶16

¶17

¶18

Destiny Peery

realities identified by the new American dilemma of race. Seattle Schools, 30 Grutter v.
Bollinger,31 and Ricci v. DeStefano32 all set out colorblindness as the only acceptable path
to achieving racial equality despite the continued debate about colorblind versus raceconscious approaches to diversity.
The plaintiffs in Seattle Schools33 challenged a program designed to integrate the
public school system. Public school officials in Seattle used white and non-white
classifications as factors in school assignments. In order to help balance and integrate the
most popular schools, the challenged school assignment system gave some students
preference for assignment to the most popular schools on the basis of their race (in other
words, if a child‘s race or ethnicity was underrepresented, he or she was more likely to be
assigned to the school than a white student).34 Parents of children denied admission to
their preferred school filed suit, claiming that the plan implemented by the district
violated the guarantee of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.35
The Supreme Court struck down the district‘s system for integrating its schools. 36
The crux of the Court‘s opinion hinges on Chief Justice Roberts‘s underlying theory that
the way to rid society of discrimination is to stop discriminating (in other words,
distinguishing in any sense) on the basis of race. 37 Justice Roberts‘s approach is a
colorblind one. He argues that distinctions on the basis of race are inherently bad when
present in a society striving for equality. 38 Roberts views race as a forbidden
classification because he believes that racial categories prevent people from thinking of
others as individuals rather than simply members of their racial groups.39
Furthermore, the majority opines that allowing the Seattle School District to
consider race would interfere with the ―ultimate goal‖ of eliminating the use of race and
other ―irrelevant‖ social categories in government decision-making.40 Justice Thomas
relies heavily on Justice Harlan‘s colorblind analysis in Plessy41 to support the court‘s
holding, arguing that (1) the Constitution is colorblind, and that (2) any form of racial
preference or classification on the basis of race, even if meant to increase racial diversity,
violates the principle of Constitutional colorblindness. 42
The Seattle Schools opinion cited to Grutter v. Bollinger,43 a case involving a suit
by an applicant denied admission to the University of Michigan‘s law school. That
institution‘s admissions policy required officials to evaluate applicants in light of test
scores and GPAs, as well as ―soft‖ variables that contribute to the student body‘s
diversity, broadly defined. 44 In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the university‘s
30

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
32
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
33
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
34
Id. at 710.
35
Id. at 710–11.
36
Id. at 711.
37
Id. at 748.
38
Id. at 746.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 730.
41
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 748–81 (Thomas, J., concurring).
43
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
44
Id. at 315.
31
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admission policies because the law school had taken a holistic approach by using a race
―plus‖ system of consideration45 that emphasized diversity in consideration of candidates
without any particular requirements for numbers or makeup of the diverse student body
desired. 46
The majority and minority in Grutter v. Bollinger articulate reservations about
upholding the University of Michigan Law School‘s admission policy, and those qualms
evince their belief in a colorblind ideal. 47 The majority suggested that while raceconsciousness is necessary now, as race-neutral policies become sufficient to provide for
a representative and diverse student body, race-conscious policies should be immediately
terminated.48 Justice O‘Connor wrote that ―we expect that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.‖49
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court reveals its optimism that racial discrimination, the
wrong which affirmative action was meant to address, is becoming less prevalent.
The dissenting and concurring opinions in Grutter echo the reservations of the
majority, although more strongly. For example, the dissenting opinions refer to the
practices of Michigan‘s law school as ―discrimination.‖ 50 Relying on the colorblind
principle first identified by Justice Harlan in Plessy, Justices Thomas and Scalia argue
that allowing such discrimination on the basis of race weakens the colorblind ideal
underlying both the Declaration of Independence 51 and the Equal Protection Clause 52 as
put forth by Justice Harlan. 53
Despite the majority allowing, for the time being, the University of Michigan to
consider race in the midst of an amorphous and vague admissions policy, the majority
and minority opinions converge on the idea that Michigan‘s policy violated the ideal
principle of colorblindness.54 All of the decisions argue that American society should
strive towards achieving the colorblind ideal that would deem this type of policy
unnecessary sooner rather than later. 55
The most recent case at the Supreme Court level addressing colorblindness and the
anti-discrimination principle is Ricci v. DeStefano.56 In Ricci, white firefighters from
New Haven, Connecticut, sued their employer, the New Haven Fire Department, for
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 57 The Fire Department
decided to throw out a promotion exam because it discriminated against black and
Hispanic firefighters.
The white firefighters claimed that decision constituted
discrimination against those white firefighters who did not receive a promotion after the
Department threw out the exam. 58 The white firefighters argued that the Fire Department
45

Id. at 336, 341.
Id. at 335–36.
47
Id. at 338.
48
Id. at 342–43.
49
Id. at 343.
50
See, e.g., id. at 387–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (―[A]ll men are created equal.‖).
52
See source cited supra note 12.
53
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting in part).
54
Id. at 306.
55
Id.
56
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
57
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
58
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658.
46
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intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of their race. 59 Specifically, the
white firefighters asserted that but for their race, the exam would not have been thrown
out and they would not have been denied promotions. 60 The Fire Department, for its part,
stated that it threw out the exam to avoid a Title VII discrimination claim by the black
firefighters under a theory of disparate impact.61
¶23
Justice Kennedy, delivering the Court‘s opinion, opined that the fire department‘s
actions were impermissible, unless it could show ―a strong basis‖ 62 that a disparate
impact claim was possible and thus needed to be avoided. 63 Kennedy‘s opinion pitted
disparate treatment claims against disparate impact claims, 64 suggesting that employers
must be aware of racial disparities in employment outcomes (for example, promotions
and hiring), but employers cannot address those disparities unless it is relatively certain
that they will be held liable for them.65 The Court explicitly said, ―the City was not
entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the racial disparity in the results.‖ 66
¶24
The decision in Ricci represents a reemergence of the strong relationship between
the colorblind ideal and the anti-discrimination principle observed prior to the civil rights
era. This shift back toward a strong association between these two principles endangers
contemporary approaches to the anti-discrimination principle as it challenges the ability
to use race in order to remedy racial inequalities. 67 Furthermore, the majority in Ricci
created a new standard (―strong basis‖)68 for addressing racial disparities in the
workplace, but not without creating fear of possible legal liability from either action or
inaction. By pushing a colorblind approach, the new standard confuses those making a
good faith effort to avoid discrimination by prohibiting them from preventing
discrimination against one group out of fear of discriminating against another.
C. Contemporary Legal Scholars and Colorblindness
¶25

Despite contemporary case law‘s advocacy for the colorblind ideal, legal scholars
continue to debate whether colorblindness or race-consciousness best addresses racial
inequalities. The primary argument of those who advocate for race-consciousness is the
same one that was prominent during the civil rights movement. Namely, they argue that
race-consciousness is necessary to achieve equal treatment (in other words,
colorblindness in practice) in key areas of ongoing inequality. However, legal scholars in
favor of the colorblind ideal argue that it is race-consciousness itself that leads to
continued racial inequalities.

59

Id.
Id.
61
Id. at 2664.
62
Id. at 2662.
63
Id.
64
Disparate treatment claims are brought on the basis of explicit unequal treatment between different
groups, whereas disparate impact claims are brought on the basis of differential outcomes between different
groups resulting from a facially-neutral policy or procedure. See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1964); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
65
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2662.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 2662.
60
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One argument made for race-consciousness, as suggested above, is that raceconscious law is necessary to monitor our commitment to colorblindness with respect to
equal access to resources like housing, education, and employment.69 This argument
asserts that legal mechanisms can only prevent discrimination on the basis of race in
these regulated domains and address institutionalized inequalities resulting from
historical discrimination if it is possible to monitor race and hold liable those who
discriminate on the basis of race. 70 For example, Professors Alexander Aleinikoff and
Cheryl Harris argue that instituting a colorblind approach permits American society to
ignore or excuse the existing racial inequality in part because monitoring would be
disallowed in a colorblind system. 71 In other words, if the law prohibits classification on
the basis of race, which presumably could prohibit recording any information about race
(for example, census counts of racial group membership), it would be impossible to
prevent ongoing and future discrimination even in those domains where race predicts
disparate outcomes because no action would be possible without some monitoring for
ongoing discrimination.
¶27
Another argument for race-consciousness is that it avoids the problem of denial of
discrimination. In other words, it prevents complete denial of the history and legacy of
discrimination and its effects on those minority groups who have long suffered from its
detrimental effects. For example, Professor John Duncan argues that it is the denial of
this legacy that, in part, makes a colorblind approach so unappealing to minority groups,
as it represents a denial of an identity that is influenced by a history of discrimination. 72
¶28
Finally, those in favor of race-consciousness argue that colorblindness is a strategy
by which the majority can protect and maintain its status by maintaining the
discriminatory status quo in its favor.73 Majority group members may be motivated, in
part, to advocate for a colorblind approach because it allows them to avoid
acknowledging or remedying inequalities while maintaining their relative advantages.
For example, Professor Reva Siegel argues that colorblindness allows individuals,
particularly those in the majority, to rationalize the status quo, even one with observable
inequalities. 74
D. Where Does the Law Stand?
¶29

While legal academics continue to debate amongst themselves about the virtues of
the colorblind ideal, the Supreme Court has moved firmly in the direction of advocating
for a resurgence of the colorblind ideal as the only means to truly eradicating racial
discrimination and disparities.75 The Supreme Court may be motivated both by the desire
to enforce the anti-discrimination principle and by a desire to view the admittedly great
69

See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 CAL L. REV. 907 (2006); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991).
70
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 69.
71
Id.
72
John C. Duncan, Jr., The American “Legal” Dilemma: Colorblind I/Colorblind II—The Rules Have
Changed Again: A Semantic Permutation, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 315 (2000).
73
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000).
74
Id.
75
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

480

Vol. 6:2]

Destiny Peery

strides already made toward racial equality as sufficient to begin dismantling the very
system of law that made those strides possible. The Court even goes so far as to claim
that American society‘s progress towards racial equality is on track now to achieve
further equality without intervention by the courts in the form of race-conscious law and
policy.
¶30
Unfortunately, the Court has not fully considered whether colorblindness actually
leads to the racial equality it is intended to produce and support. A review of the
empirical social psychological literature suggests that the story of colorblindness is more
complicated than that presented by the optimistic, and possibly overly idealistic, judges
who favor this approach.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CATEGORIES: HOW AND WHY WE SEE RACE IN THE FIRST PLACE
¶31

To put it simply, people are not colorblind. Basic cognitive and social
psychological research demonstrates that people use many types of social categories,
including race, and the use of categories is adaptive and functional when dealing with the
complex, social world in which we all live. 76 In other words, it is necessary for people to
use relatively simple categories to aid efficient navigation of life‘s complexities.
¶32
In his research focused on understanding the creation and hierarchies of categories
generally, Professor Gregory Jones has studied the distinction between basic and nonbasic categories, and found that basic categories, in particular, aid in making cognitive
processing easier.77 Basic categories are those that are sufficiently inclusive (in other
words, they do not include or exclude too many potential category members) and those
that have multiple common attributes that make sorting people (or objects) into those
categories possible by comparing the number of shared attributes between the group and
the potential category member.78 In addition, basic social categories, like race and
gender, are often automatically activated upon encountering social targets (in other
words, other people) and allow for easier processing of the social world. 79
¶33
This research suggests that categories are not inherently bad as has been argued by
Supreme Court Justices like Roberts and Thomas. Rather, this research suggests that
categories are a necessary part of human cognitive processing of the world around them.
It is certainly the case, as suggested by Chief Justice Roberts, 80 that people cannot
discriminate against people belonging to different groups if there is no recognition of
different groups, but it is not the recognition of groups in and of itself that leads to
discrimination. For example, positive outcomes for intergroup contact have been
observed where approaches to diversity that recognize and appreciate differences are
utilized. This research suggests that even when the groups interacting are historically
socially-stratified, such as racial groups, it is not inherently problematic to notice or even
76

See, e.g., C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically About
Others, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93 (2000).
77
Gregory V. Jones, Identifying Basic Categories, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 423, 423 (1983).
78
James E. Corter & Mark A. Gluck, Explaining Basic Categories: Feature Predictability and Information,
111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 291, 301 (1992).
79
C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Categorical Person Perception, 92 BRITISH
J. PSYCHOL. 239 (2001).
80
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 748 (―The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discrimination on the basis of race.‖).
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use race as information in social interactions. 81 In addition, children (even babies) have
been shown to notice and sort people into categories on the basis of skin color long
before they are aware of the stigma that may be attached to particular group
memberships.82
¶34
In addition to using categories adaptively to navigate our social worlds, it is likely
nearly impossible to avoid noticing basic social categories like race and gender,
regardless of whether it is adaptive or not. That is, even if a social category is not
relevant for a particular interaction, the categories are still processed by social perceivers.
Further, visible social categories such as race and gender are particularly likely to be
noticed quickly and automatically, 83 and this makes such recognition relatively immune
to disruption even with the good intentions that may accompany a colorblind approach. 84
Research at the neurological level shows that race is cognitively processed the fastest of
all categories—even more quickly than gender—occurring in mere fractions of a
second.85 Again, it is important to remember that this basic process, particularly when it
occurs automatically and quickly, is not the underlying issue, as suggested by proponents
of colorblindness. Rather, racial categorization serves as a starting point that may lead to
prejudice and discrimination, but this path to prejudice and discrimination is not
automatic.
¶35
In addition to the psychological realities of racial salience, race is just as salient a
social and cultural phenomenon. Much of U.S. history is characterized by stratification
on the basis of race and conflicts over racial and ethnic identity, group status, and access
to resources. Thus, race continues to predict key social outcomes in areas such as
housing, education and employment where government intervention has long sought to
remedy this stratification.86 Some groups tend to fare better than others, and the
maintenance of racial inequalities leads to the continued salience of race. As a result,
minority group members continue to feel the often negative impact of their racial
backgrounds on their identities, life experiences, and outcomes, while majority group
members continue to receive privileges on the basis of theirs. 87

81

See, e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum, Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Seeing Race and Seeming
Racist? Evaluating Colorblindness in Social Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918 (2008).
82
See, e.g., D. J. Kelly, P. C. Quinn, A. M. Slater, K. Lee, L. Ge & O. Pascalis, The Other-Race Effect
Develops During Infancy: Evidence of Perceptual Narrowing, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1084 (2007);
MARGUERITE A. WRIGHT, I‘M CHOCOLATE, YOU‘RE VANILLA: RAISING HEALTHY BLACK AND BIRACIAL
CHILDREN IN A RACE-CONSCIOUS WORLD (1998).
83
Tiffany A. Ito & Geoffrey R. Urland, Race and Gender on the Brain: Electrocortical Measures of
Attention to the Race and Gender of Multiply Categorizable Individuals, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 616 (2003).
84
See, e.g., id. (demonstrating that it takes mere milliseconds for the brain to register the category
memberships of social targets along dimensions of race, which are unlikely to be disrupted by motivational
intentions).
85
Id.
86
Sobering Statistics, supra note 8.
87
See, e.g., Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, WOMEN‘S
INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, July/August1989,
http://www.libary.wisc.edu/EDVRC/docs/public/pdfs/LIReading/InvisibleKnapsack.pdf.
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IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLORBLINDNESS

¶36

For several decades, social institutions, such as the educational system and legal
and political domains, have been interested in learning to build tolerance across group
lines and eradicate prejudice and discrimination directed at minority groups.88 While the
interest is often construed broadly in terms of how to deal with diversity of any kind, in
the United States, concerns about diversity are rooted in a history of racial strife
characterized by institutionalized inequalities that have only been erased at blatant levels
in the last couple decades. Many years at this point have been dedicated to the
development and testing of diversity programming aimed at fostering positive intergroup
relations and decreasing intergroup bias. 89 Only recently has the field of psychology
taken up the task of considering the psychological implications of these diversity
measures. Within the last ten to fifteen years, psychologists have become interested in
examining the psychological effects that different approaches to diversity have on
subsequent intergroup contact.90
¶37
The two major approaches to dealing with diversity have been colorblindness and
multiculturalism, as discussed throughout this Comment. The research comparing these
two approaches has largely considered how much each approach reduces expressions of
prejudice and stereotyping, given that this is a primary aim of diversity ideology
generally. 91 More recent research, however, has considered the distinction between
explicit and implicit forms of bias,92 as well as the effects these ideologies have on actual
interracial interactions from the perspective of participants (both majority and minority
group members).93 A review of this literature will highlight the differences between
colorblindness and multiculturalism not only in terms of the tenets of the two approaches,
but also in terms of their collective effects on intergroup contact. This review should
inform the debate about colorblindness and race-consciousness in the law by
supplementing the intuitions of legal scholars with empirical data showing the actual
efficacy of these two approaches in eradicating racial inequality and improving race
relations.

88

See, e.g., J. W. Schofield, The Colorblind Perspective in School: Causes and Consequences, in
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (J. A. Banks & C. A. McGee Banks eds., 2007);
D. W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139 (2008); J. M. Jones,
Psychological Knowledge and the New America Dilemma of Race, 54 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 641 (1998).
89
See, e.g., STEVEN BREWSTER, MOLLY BUCKLEY, PHILLIP COX & LOUISE GRIEP, PLAN: NET LIMITED,
DIVERSITY EDUCATION RESEARCH PROJECT: LITERATURE REVIEW (2002),
http://culture.alberta.ca/humanrights/publications/docs/LiteratureReview.pdf.
90
See studies cited infra Part IV.A.
91
See, e.g., Christopher Wolsko, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bernd Wittenbrink, Framing
Interethnic Ideology: Effects of Multicultural and Color-Blind Perspectives on Judgments of Groups and
Individuals, 78 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 635 (2000), available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/bernd.wittenbrink/research/pdf/wpjw00.pdf.
92
Implicit bias refers to bias resulting from automatic cognitive processes and often occurs outside of
awareness. Explicit bias refers to bias that is conscious and explicitly stated by the holder of that bias. See,
e.g., Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindness
on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417 (2004).
93
See, e.g., Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers, Evan P. Apfelbaum, Natassia Pura & Dan Ariely,
Colorblindness and Interracial Interaction: Playing the Political Correctness Game, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 949
(2006).
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A. The Ease and Efficacy of Colorblind Versus Multicultural (Race-Conscious)
Approaches to Diversity
¶38

Many laypersons and courts consider colorblindness a comparatively easy strategy
to adopt because it purportedly only requires that one not ―see‖ race. 94 In addition, one
can simply claim to not see race and then not mention race, and the illusion of
colorblindness is created. The introductory quote by Justice Roberts is illustrative.
Roberts suggests that the best way to avoid negative intergroup divisions is to avoid
intergroup divisions in the first place. 95
¶39
On the other hand, multicultural approaches require greater effort. They require
acknowledging both similarities and differences, while simultaneously avoiding the
negative effects that may stem from noticing differences between groups. 96 While
colorblindness is an intuitively easier strategy for many people to conceptualize and
utilize at a superficial level, 97 it is in fact far more difficult to put into practice than
people tend to realize. People are not, after all, colorblind and wishing that were the case
does not make it so.98 With this premise in mind, research has investigated just how
colorblind people actually are when encountering intergroup contact situations.
¶40
Professor Christopher Wolsko and his colleagues conducted one of the first
psychological experiments comparing colorblind and multicultural ideologies and their
effects on subsequent judgments of same race and other race groups and individuals. 99
They first randomly assigned participants in the study to a colorblind or multicultural
mindset, which was induced by having them read a short article advocating for either a
colorblind approach that favors seeing all people as individuals or a multicultural
approach that favors acknowledging and appreciating racial group differences. They then
wrote five points in favor of adopting a colorblind versus multicultural approach
depending on the condition they were assigned to.100 Wolsko found that those in both
colorblind and multicultural conditions showed less ingroup favoritism 101 in the form of
less positive ratings for the participant‘s own group compared to a control group that did
not adopt either a colorblind or multicultural mindset.102 There were differences between
those in the colorblind and multicultural conditions though, as the colorblind group
expressed lower levels of stereotypicality103 of blacks. Simply put, those in the
colorblind condition associated blacks less strongly with typical black stereotypes,
94

Id. at 649 (explaining that colorblindness is a means to demonstrating that one is not a racist by adopting
that perspective that ―If I do not notice race, then I cannot be racist‖).
95
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (―The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimination on the basis of race.‖).
96
Wolsko et al., supra note 91 (demonstrating that multiculturalism can have the ironic effect of increasing
stereotyping).
97
Colorblindness only requires that people avoid noticing and mentioning race as opposed to noticing and
appreciating the similarities and differences between racial groups, as is required by multiculturalism.
98
In fact, people automatically see and sort others into social categories, particularly race but also gender
and age groups, within milliseconds. See Ito & Urland, supra note 83.
99
Wolsko et al., supra note 91.
100
Id. at 638.
101
Marilyn B. Brewer, Ingroup Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive—Motivational
Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 207 (1979) (defining in-group favoritism as ―attitudinal and perceptual
biases in favor of members of one‘s own group over members of other groups‖).
102
Wolsko et al., supra note 91, at 639 tbl.2.
103
Stereotypicality is the tendency to perceive individuals as prototypical of a general stereotype.
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whereas those in the multicultural group expressed higher levels of stereotypicality of
blacks on both positive and negative stereotypes.104 That is, those participants in the
multicultural condition perceived black targets to be more prototypical of a stereotypical
black person (for example, less intelligent and more athletic) than those participants in
the colorblind condition.
¶41
In two additional studies, Wolsko and his colleagues found additional effects such
that those in a colorblind mindset thought that the goals of blacks and whites were more
similar than those in the multicultural mindset.105 Those in a colorblind mindset ignored
racial category membership when forming impressions of target people, whereas those in
the multicultural mindset did not ignore this information. 106 It might seem fair to
conclude that the individuals in the colorblind mindset were performing better with
regard to the task of appearing tolerant and not letting race influence their judgments, but
additional findings from this same research suggest that the use of racial category
information by those in the multicultural condition made them more accurate in their
judgments, in part because race was at times useful information, rather than simply
evidence of bias.107
¶42
Researchers conducted another study using children‘s performance in a ―guesswho‖ game that requires the use of visual characteristics to narrow down a pool of
potential matches to one.108 The game was set up as either race-neutral or race-relevant,
such that in one version (the race-neutral version), the race of the people in the pool was
not helpful in differentiating between individuals, and in the other version (the racerelevant version), it was useful. 109 The study compared the performance of younger and
older children to demonstrate that the older children, being more likely to have
internalized the colorblind norms of society, would perform worse in the race-relevant
version of the game because they would be reluctant to use relevant race information
during the game. In fact, Professor Evan Apfelbaum and his colleagues did find that
older students took longer to play the game (i.e., they had to ask more questions to arrive
at the correct target) than younger students, thereby performing worse when racial
information was relevant.110 Taken together, the research of Professors Wolsko and
Apfelbaum suggests that accuracy and performance in a social task or interaction may be
impaired by a colorblind approach that inhibits the use of race even when it is relevant
information in a social interaction.
¶43
Research continues to tease apart the relative advantages and disadvantages of
colorblindness and multiculturalism for interracial interactions. For example, Professor
Apfelbaum and his colleagues have argued that people use colorblindness strategically to
avoid talking about race when they think it may make them appear racist, such as in
interracial interactions.111 In three studies, they examined the efficacy of this ―strategic
104

Wolsko et al., supra note 91, at 639 tbl.1.
Id. at 644 tbl.4.
106
Id. at 647 tbl.6.
107
Id. at 643, 648.
108
Evan P. Apfelbaum, Kristin Pauker, Nalini Ambady, Samuel R. Sommers & Michal I. Norton, Learning
(Not) to Talk About Race: When Older Children Underperform in Social Categorization, 44
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1513 (2008).
109
Id. at 1514 fig.1.
110
Id. at 1515 fig.2.
111
Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81.
105
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colorblindness‖112 for fostering racial tolerance. In their first study, white participants
who were most concerned about appearing prejudiced were also the most likely to adopt
a colorblind approach, yet this had the ironic effect of making these same individuals
appear less friendly to the black interaction partners they completed a ―guess-who‖ game
similar to the one described above with, 113 increasing the chance that their black
interaction partners might think their unfriendly behavior was due to bias. 114
¶44
A second study found that adopting a colorblind approach and avoiding the topic
of race required cognitive resources. When using this strategy in an interracial
interaction, it depleted the individuals of valuable cognitive resources necessary for
exhibiting positive nonverbal behaviors. 115 This made them less able to monitor their
actual behaviors to ensure a friendly interaction. 116 Whites who were most likely to
adopt a colorblind approach also believed that those who exhibit colorblindness are less
prejudiced than those who acknowledge race for any reason, as demonstrated in a third
study. 117 Unfortunately, this stood in sharp contrast to the perceptions of the black
interaction partners of these individuals. While those who presented themselves as
colorblind believed they appeared the most non-prejudiced (compared to those who
acknowledged race), their interaction partners interpreted their attitude as evidence of
racial bias rather than evidence of non-bias.118
¶45
In a final study, a qualifying condition of the backlash effect (in other words, the
effect that those who thought they were the most non-biased were perceived as the most
biased) was found.119 In situations where race was relatively less relevant or completely
irrelevant to the interaction, colorblindness corresponded to perceptions of less bias. That
is, when race was irrelevant, individuals taking a colorblind approach in the interaction
were perceived as the least biased, in accordance with their views of themselves as nonbiased. This finding highlights that colorblindness is not entirely bad and can be
effective under particular conditions. 120 As was the case in this study, when it did not
make sense to bring up the topic of race during the interaction, those who avoided doing
so (by adopting a colorblind approach) were perceived as less biased. 121 Unfortunately,
given the salience of race, there are many times when race is, in fact, relevant. Ignoring
the relevance of race at those times, then, is clearly detrimental.
¶46
The ironic effects of colorblindness in interracial interactions have also been
demonstrated by Professor Jennifer Richeson and her colleagues. They, too, have
demonstrated that the desire to appear unprejudiced, which presumably includes
appearing colorblind for many people, ironically negatively impacts interracial
112

Id. at 918.
Id. at 922.
114
Id. at 926.
115
Id. at 924.
116
Id. at 925.
117
Id. at 927 fig.3.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 929 fig.4. Professor Correll and his colleagues also suggest that whether a situation is
characterized by high or low conflict may also make colorblindness a more or less efficacious strategy for
dealing with intergroup relations in these circumstances. Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park & J. Allegra
Smith, Colorblind and Multicultural Prejudice Reduction Strategies in High-Conflict Situation, 11 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 471 (2008).
121
Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81, at 928.
113
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interactions by leading to more negative reactions from other race interaction partners, as
well as increased perceptions of bias for the white participants who are the most
motivated to appear non-prejudiced.122 In a set of studies pitting a multicultural approach
against a colorblind approach, those who adopted a colorblind approach to interracial
interactions also exhibited higher levels of racial bias on both explicit (self-reported,
deliberative responses) and implicit (automatic responses) measures of prejudice. 123
These results are directly counter to the goals of colorblindness espoused by many who
adopt the approach as a means to decrease bias.
¶47
Professor Jacquie Vorauer and her colleagues have examined the relationship
between multicultural and colorblind approaches and their effects on interracial contact
from the perspective of both interaction partners as well. 124 In two studies, Professor
Vorauer showed that a multicultural approach, which she argues caused people in
interactions to focus more on their interaction partners, led to more positive interracial
interactions than a colorblind approach, which led people to be self-focused in order to
monitor their thoughts and behavior in the interaction. 125 Thus, again, research suggests
that colorblindness in an interracial interaction is cognitively taxing and possibly prevents
positive interracial interactions from occurring.
¶48
However, Professors Nicole Shelton and Jennifer Richeson demonstrated a
possible ironic effect in favor of colorblindness when they demonstrated that high-bias
whites interacting with black partners were better liked than low-bias whites.126 They
argue that this appears to occur because high-bias whites try harder to overcome their
bias in interactions with people of other races (with strategies including behaving in a
colorblind manner) in order to avoid appearing prejudiced. Low-bias whites, however,
may make less of an effort because they believe it is apparent to their black interaction
partner that they are low in bias. 127 Taken together, these studies suggest that
colorblindness may be an effective strategy for some under certain conditions, but they
largely highlight that a colorblind approach can be problematic in the very situations it is
supposed to be most useful for.
¶49
Psychologists, in light of the research discussed above, have also been interested in
the underlying variables leading to the often negative effects of colorblindness. One such
variable underlying the negative effects observed in interracial interactions may be a
within-person divergence between what an individual explicitly communicates about
their racial bias and the implicit bias operating outside of one‘s conscious control.
Colorblindness may lead one to express less bias explicitly but may actually exacerbate
bias implicitly. A study of bias at these two levels (explicit and implicit) found that
individuals in a colorblind mindset in a high-intergroup conflict situation (in other words,
a situation involving intergroup competition for scarce resources) expressed less bias
122

See Sophie Trawalter, Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Predicting Behavior During Interracial
Interactions: A Stress and Coping Approach, 13 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 243 (2009); J. Nicole
Shelton, Jennifer A. Richeson, Jessica Salvatore & Sophie Trawalter, Ironic Effects of Racial Bias During
Interracial Interactions, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 397 (2005); Richeson & Nussbaum, supra note 92.
123
Richeson & Nussbaum, supra note 92.
124
Jacquie D. Vorauer, Annette Gagnon & Stacey J. Sasaki, Salient Intergroup Ideology and Intergroup
Interaction, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 838 (2009).
125
Id.
126
Shelton et al., supra note 122.
127
Id. at 5.
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explicitly (as measured by questions gauging explicit self-reported feelings toward
another group), but exhibited greater bias at an implicit level (as measured by a task that
captures automatic responses).128 Implicit bias, regardless of explicit, self-reported bias,
can affect subsequent behaviors and judgments in negative ways, producing displays of
prejudice and leading to discrimination much in the way it is assumed that explicit
prejudice does.129
¶50
In addition, they found that the same colorblind participants who expressed less
explicit bias during the high-conflict situation experienced a rebound effect such that
twenty minutes later they expressed greater explicit bias than their baseline.130 For those
participants in a multicultural mindset, their level of bias of both kinds (explicit, selfreport and automatic, implicit associations) increased in the high-conflict situation and
decreased slightly twenty minutes after considering the situation, demonstrating a
correspondence between the two levels of bias, as well as an absence of the ironic effect
that led colorblind individuals to express greater bias after the fact.131
¶51
As some of the research discussed above has suggested, it is important to consider
the effect that various approaches to diversity have on those they are meant to protect and
benefit. The interracial interaction studies discussed above suggest that the perceptions
of whites and blacks in interracial interactions can diverge significantly. Whites often
leave interactions feeling good about their ability to behave in a non-biased way and the
positivity of their other race partner‘s perceptions of them, whereas blacks participating
in the same interactions see many of the same behaviors as evidence of racial bias and
find their other race partners unfriendly.
B. Preferences for Diversity Ideology
¶52

There are other ways in which reactions to colorblindness and multiculturalism
diverge. For example, majority and minority groups tend to differ in terms of their
overall preferences for one approach or the other. Presumably this is because of different
motivations for adopting a particular approach and different life experiences that lead one
to value different aspects of the two approaches. 132 In addition, majority and minority
group status, as well as preferences for colorblindness versus multiculturalism, may also
lead to differences in perceptions of issues around race and equality, which creates
problems when working toward resolving the racial inequalities that still exist. 133
¶53
Using a sample of participants in a diversity workshop (a situation with a likely
selection effect such that those in the diversity workshop were already more likely to care
about diversity issues and possibly were likely to exhibit less intergroup bias), Professor
128

Id. at 487.
See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
130
Correll et al., supra note 120, at 487; see also C. Neil Macrae, Galen V. Bodenhausen, A. B. Milne & J.
Jetten, Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
808 (1994) (demonstrating that suppressing stereotypes or biased thoughts that come to mind leads them to
re-emerge stronger than before they were suppressed, leading to even more bias).
131
Correll et al., supra note 120, at 487.
132
See, e.g., Ryan et al., supra note 5; Andrew R. Todd & Adam Galinsky, The Intimate Connection
Between Self-Regulatory and Ideological Approaches to Managing Diversity (Nov. 9, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
133
Todd & Galinsky, supra note 132.
129
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Carey Ryan and her colleagues investigated relative preferences for colorblind versus
multicultural approaches between white majority group members and black minority
group members.134 In the first study, Professor Ryan found that white participants were
more likely to endorse a colorblind ideology than black participants, and that black
participants were more likely to endorse a multicultural ideology than a colorblind
ideology.135 Further, they found that whereas whites who endorsed a colorblind ideology
perceived more similarities between blacks and whites, blacks who endorsed a
multicultural ideology showed a similar effect, suggesting that the different approaches
produce similar results for different groups of people. 136
¶54
In a second study, black participants thought that a multicultural approach would
lead to more positive interactions, whereas white participants thought that a colorblind
approach would lead to more positive intergroup interactions. 137 Professor Ryan argues
that colorblindness is preferred by majority groups because it is easy and justifies the
status quo,138 making it unnecessary to deal with the continuing presence of racial
prejudice and inequality. 139 This same argument has been made by proponents of raceconsciousness in the law.140
¶55
Similar group preferences for colorblindness and multiculturalism exist in the
business context. Professor Flannery Stevens and her colleagues argue that minority
group members prefer workplaces and diversity ideologies in the workplace that are
multicultural, allowing them to utilize and express the different perspectives that may
result from their experience as members of non-majority social groups.141 Furthermore,
researchers have also demonstrated that the psychological engagement of minority group
members in the workplace is greater in a setting where dominant group members prefer
multiculturalism to colorblindness. 142 On the other hand, majority group members dislike
multicultural approaches, at least those that seem to exclude majority group culture,
because they feel overlooked as unimportant contributors to diversity. 143 Instead, as
suggested by the research above, whites prefer a colorblind approach that de-emphasizes
social group membership. 144
C. Perpetuating Prejudice
¶56

If colorblindness can be seen as a means to avoid addressing issues of race, then it
is also informative as to whether adopting a colorblind or multicultural mindset is likely
to affect one‘s perceptions of discrimination and bias. While it has been argued that the
use of racial categories must be avoided in order to avoid discriminating on the basis of

134

Ryan et al., supra note 5.
Id. at 623 tbl.2.
136
Id. at 624 fig.1.
137
Id. at 631.
138
Id. at 632.
139
Id. at 619.
140
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 73.
141
Stevens et al., supra note 6.
142
Victoria C. Plaut, Kecia M. Thomas & Matt J. Goren, Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness Better for
Minorities?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 444, 445 (2009).
143
Stevens et al., supra note 6, at 121.
144
Id. at 120.
135
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race, it is also possible that avoiding racial categories could perpetuate continuing
prejudice and discrimination.
¶57
Colorblindness has been shown to lead children to recount situations involving
racial bias in ways that downplay the relevance or seriousness of race and racial bias,
even in situations where its relevance is blatant.145 In their study, they put children in
either a colorblind or multicultural (or ―value-diversity‖)146 mindset by exposing them to
messages advocating for one approach or the other.147 They then exposed them to
interactions between students involving no-bias, ambiguous bias, or blatant bias. In the
blatant bias situation, the children learned that a white child engaged in an unprovoked
physical assault of a black child based on the stereotype that blacks are aggressive. Of
those in the multicultural mindset, 77 percent of them perceived bias in the blatant bias
scenario, whereas only 50 percent of those in the colorblind mindset did. 148
¶58
In addition, when students were asked to explain what happened in these scenarios,
those in a colorblind mindset were less likely to mention race or to describe the incident
as serious enough to warrant teacher intervention, suggesting a downplaying (intentional
or not) of the blatant racial bias aspect contained in the scenario. 149
¶59
Professors Andrew Todd and Adam Galinsky conducted related research with
adults investigating the effect that colorblind versus multicultural ideologies have on
perceptions of racial progress and prevalence of ongoing discrimination. 150 In this
research, Professor Todd demonstrated that white study participants who took the
perspective of a Latino person during the course of the experiment, thus adopting a
perspective that made racial differences more salient (including differences in likelihood
of experiencing prejudice and discrimination), increased the white participants‘
perceptions of racial inequality and increased their support for social policies directed at
redressing historical and contemporary racial biases. 151 Further, in another study,
Professor Todd found that white study participants who were primed with a multicultural
approach to diversity compared to a colorblind approach were also more likely to report
greater perceptions of racial inequality and support for social policies directed at
redressing historical and contemporary racial inequalities, such as affirmative action. 152
D. When Colorblindness is Beneficial
¶60

As alluded to above, it is unfair to say that adopting a colorblind approach is
completely ineffective as a strategy for dealing with diversity issues. For example, where
race is irrelevant, taking a colorblind approach and avoiding mention of race has positive
effects for both parties in the interaction. 153 In addition, in high conflict situations (those
involving high levels of potential intergroup conflict or competition), it may be beneficial
145

Evan P. Apfelbaum, Kristin Pauker, Samuel R. Sommers & Nalini Ambady, In Blind Pursuit of Racial
Equality?, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1587 (2010).
146
Id. at 1588.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 1589–90.
149
Id. at 1590.
150
Todd & Galinsky, supra note 132.
151
Id. at 16–17.
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Id. at 18.
153
Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81.
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to take a colorblind approach because it leads to decreased expressions of explicit bias in
the midst of the high conflict intergroup situation, which may serve to smooth over the
situation in the moment.154
¶61
In general, however, research suggests that under many circumstances
colorblindness is detrimental to everyone involved. For majority group members or
others adopting this approach, it can lead to increased likelihood of being seen as biased
in interracial interactions, 155 as well as decreases in efficiency, performance,156 and
awareness of social realities of inequality. 157 For minority groups, the effects are equally
negative, as individuals in these groups may face unfriendly interactions with people
perceived to be biased against them, 158 denial of social realities of inequality that affect
their lives, 159 denial of social identities that are important to them160 and their wellbeing, 161 and even increased experiences of bias.162
¶62
Given this, the best approach to dealing with diversity in society as a whole and
the domain of law specifically is unlikely to be colorblindness. True colorblindness does
not exist and it may not even be desirable if it were to exist.163

154

See Correll et al., supra note 120, at 488.
See, e.g., Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81 (showing that those who failed to mention race when race was
relevant, thus adopting a colorblind approach, were also more likely to exhibit unfriendly nonverbal
behaviors that were noticed and perceived negatively by their interaction partners); Richeson & Nussbaum,
supra note 92.
156
See, e.g., Apfelbaum et al., supra note 108, at 1515–16 (showing that children who played a matching
game where race was a useful identifying characteristic but failed to use race took significantly longer to
play the game than those who mentioned race); Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81 (showing that adults who
completed a photo identification task where race was a useful identifying characteristic but failed to use
race suffered cognitive depletion after completing the task, and this depletion subsequently impaired their
ability to interact positively with an other race partner).
157
See, e.g., Apfelbaum et al., supra note 145 (showing that children describe incidents of blatant racial
bias in ways that decrease the likelihood of teacher intervention and downplay the severity when in a
colorblind mindset compared to a mindset that values diversity); Stevens, supra note 6, at 120 (explaining
that a colorblind perspective can lead to a tendency to ignore evidence of discrimination in the form of
differential outcomes for majority versus minority group); Todd & Galinsky, supra note 132 (showing that
people report perceiving that discrimination is less of problem and that progress toward racial equality has
been greater when in a colorblind mindset compared to those in a multicultural mindset).
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See, e.g., Vorauer et al., supra note 124 (showing that Aboriginal people interacting with whites with a
colorblind approach regarded the interactions more negatively than those interacting with whites with a
multicultural approach); Apfelbaum et al., supra note 81 (showing that black people interacting with whites
with a colorblind approach perceived their interaction partners as less friendly and regarded them and the
interaction more negatively).
159
See, e.g., Todd & Galinsky, supra note 132 (describing the downplaying of social inequality by majority
group members adopting a colorblind approach).
160
See, e.g., Robert M. Sellers, Cleopatra H. Caldwell, Karen H. Schmeelk-Cone & Marc A. Zimmerman,
Racial Identity, Racial Discrimination, Perceived Stress, and Psychological Distress among African
American Young Adults, 43 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 302 (2003) (demonstrating that the centrality of
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V. CAN THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL EQUALITY BE COLORBLIND?
¶63

Can the pursuit of racial equality, under the law and in society more generally, be
racially blind? Assuming the best intentions for those committed to the colorblind ideal,
the evidence indicates that colorblindness is neither entirely possible in its most simplistic
form, nor is it desirable for achieving the goals underlying any approach to diversity:
eliminating bias and improving intergroup relations.
A. Benefits to the Majority Group

¶64

First and foremost, the psychological evidence reviewed above demonstrates the
many negative consequences of a colorblind ideology for both majority and minority
group members. In general, any benefit derived from a colorblind ideology tends to favor
the majority group, which fails to serve the very goals of any diversity ideology. The fact
that this approach favors the majority group in a number of important ways is even
offered as a reason why majority groups tend to favor such an approach to dealing with
diversity, undermining the egalitarian goals of diversity approaches.
¶65
Many legal and psychological scholars alike agree that the primary benefit of a
colorblind approach to racial diversity is experienced by whites. While minority groups
disfavor a colorblind approach because it denies their non-majority identities, majority
group members prefer such a strategy because it affords them the opportunity to avoid
dealing with racial issues.164 In addition, majority group members may also prefer
colorblindness because it serves as a means to maintain the status quo by obstructing
efforts to monitor existing inequalities that work largely in their favor as the majority. 165
Empirical evidence from psychological research demonstrates majority group preferences
for colorblindness compared to minority group members. For example, even among
individuals voluntarily participating in a diversity workshop (thus presumably
predisposed toward less bias and more interest in positive intergroup relations), whites
favored a colorblind approach more than blacks did, while blacks favored a multicultural
approach.166 These groups disagreed on which approach would lead to more positive
intergroup interaction, with each group favoring their own preference as the best means
to achieve racial harmony. 167
¶66
The theory behind the preferences of majority and minority groups demonstrated
in these empirical studies are echoed in the discussions of legal scholars. That is,
majority group members prefer the colorblind approach because, for example, they are
motivated to maintain their own higher social status, they are motivated to avoid the
threat of being faced with the realities of racial disparities resulting from racial
distinctions, and they are afraid that even mentioning race could lead others to believe
they are racist.168
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B. Negative Consequences for Interracial Contact

¶67

Empirical evidence suggests that adopting a colorblind approach in interracial
interactions, the very interactions where colorblind proponents believe it is most
beneficial, can actually lead to negative outcomes. For example, those that adopted a
colorblind approach in an interaction involving a task where race was relevant, although
neutral, also exhibited less friendly non-verbal behaviors toward their partners. 169 These
negative non-verbal behaviors led their other race interaction partners to perceive them as
less friendly. 170 In addition, individuals who were most committed to appearing nonprejudiced were also more likely to be disliked by their interaction partners. 171 In fact,
these interactions sometimes resulted in prejudiced individuals being more liked by their
other race interaction partners than those who were less prejudiced. 172 Ironically, those
who were most set on demonstrating their lack of prejudice by adopting a colorblind
approach, interacted in a more negative way with their other race partners compared to
those who were not concerned with their level of prejudice (regardless of level) because
their heightened concerns about how they appeared led them to be less comfortable in the
interaction.173 At the same time, these white participants were not aware of the ironic
effect that their adherence to colorblindness had on their black interaction partner‘s
perceptions. Instead, these white participants often believed that these interactions had
gone smoothly, that their black partners had liked them, and that they had appeared nonprejudiced.174 Thus, not only did the interactions sour from the perspective of the people
who the ―colorblind‖ whites sought to impress but these white participants did not know
they in fact offended their black interaction partners.
C. Awareness of the Reality of Inequality

¶68

Empirical evidence supports the theory of legal scholars that colorblindness
obscures racial inequalities. A colorblind mindset may lead individuals to perceive less
racial inequality and show less support for social policies directed at remedying social
inequalities. 175 In addition, the default mindset of many majority group members is
colorblindness, suggesting that they tend to see less racial inequality and show less
support for social policies directed at addressing it than other groups, particularly
minority groups for whom existing racial inequality is a more salient concern. 176
D. Race Consciousness is Required

¶69

Despite the great strides toward racial equality, we are by no means living in a
post-racial society. Racial inequality persists throughout American society, 177 either as a
169
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result of historical legacy and institutional perpetuation or as a result of continued
contemporary racial biases that result in experiences of prejudice and discrimination in
the everyday lives of racial minorities. In addition, recent social psychological research
helps reveal the ways in which racial biases, regardless of intentionality, may impact
society generally and the legal domain in particular. For example, Professor Jennifer
Eberhardt and her colleagues showed, using real-world data from death penalty cases,
that defendants with more afrocentric (more stereotypically black) features were more
likely to get the death penalty. 178 In addition to demonstrating the continued importance
of race, this research serves as a reminder that the data necessary to discover this biased
pattern would not be possible if there was an effort to be colorblind, as a colorblind
approach could preclude collection of data about racial group membership for any reason.
Thus, in a truly colorblind world, no one could argue that racial sentencing disparities
exist, for example, because race would no longer be recognized as a valid category that
bias could derive from.
E. Conclusion
Despite recent court cases, such as Ricci v. DeStefano,179 which have sought a
return to the anti-discrimination principle as interpreted in the nineteenth century, a
commitment to anti-discrimination requires a commitment to race-consciousness, not
colorblindness. The courts and society at large should give up the dream of the
colorblind ideal as the approach best able to address the realities of race relations in the
United States. The colorblind ideal now serves simply to distract society from achieving
true equality, which results not from avoiding seeing differences, but from appreciating
those differences in a way that does not disadvantage one group relative to another. As
long as racial inequalities exist, adherence to the anti-discrimination principle requires
monitoring of the relative social status of different racial groups in order to track progress
toward equality, as well as to avoid reverting back to old patterns.
¶71
Despite the emphasis on the comparison between colorblindness and
multiculturalism as strategies for contending with a diverse society, giving up on
colorblindness does not necessarily require adopting a multicultural approach. Rather,
the law should remain race-conscious, because, as this Comment demonstrates, raceconsciousness reflects the reality of the social world. In arguing for race-consciousness,
it is not necessary to argue for changes in procedure that recognize different cultural
practices, as might be required by a true multicultural approach. Rather, the emphasis
should be on maintaining an awareness of the realities of race in a legal system and
society that faces pervasive stratification on the basis of race every day. 180
¶70
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The continued attack on anti-discrimination law and affirmative action is likely to
keep the debate about colorblindness versus race-consciousness alive. Hopefully,
lawyers and judges will look to empirical realities to ground arguments for raceconsciousness. In addition, if the voices for race-consciousness can speak loudly and
persuasively, it may be enough to push back the erosion that has long been underway of
an anti-discrimination principle that recognizes the continuing reality of inequality and
provides the means to continue to address this reality.
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